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Tuesday, April 24, 2018

Rundingan Baling: Di Belakang Tabir - Bahagian x

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Menurut Sir Donald MacGillivray, Inggeris berhadapan risiko tinggi sekiranya memilih opsyen 1. Beliau menjelaskan analisis implikasi sepenuhnya mengenai opsyen ini akan dihantar dalam masa "... 4 to 5 days to complete this."

Sebaliknya, opsyen kedua kurang risiko yang akan hadapi. Beliau akan menggunakan David Marshall untuk memujuk Tunku supaya bersetuju bahawa:

1. Sebarang persetujuan dengan Chin Peng tidak dilaksanakan selagi semua senjata diserahkan; tiada senjata disimpan dalam hutan seperti yang berlaku pada 1946.

2.  Hak menghantar pengganas ke China dikekalkan.

3.  Klausa tertentu Emergency Regulations dibatalkan tetapi klausa yang membabitkan "...to combat subversion (especially the right of arrest and detention) would be retained."

Masalahnya, bahaya yang mungkin dihadapi ialah Chin Peng mahu Tunku menetapkan tarikh kemerdekaan Malaya. MacGillavray seterusnya menyatakan bahawa "...The Chief Ministers would, of course, have to support this demand and I am afraid I would not now put it beyond Abdul Rahman to have this possibility in mind."


Alan Tindal Lennox-Boyd, 1st Viscount Boyd of Merton, by Bassano Ltd - NPG x152068"...4 to 5 days"? Terkejut berok Lennox-Boyd (kiri) bila membaca telegram MacGillivray. Dah le dia tak tahu yang Tunku dah heboh memaklumkan kepada semua yang beliau (Tunku) sedia berjumpa dengan ketua pengganas, Pesuruhjaya pula memerlukan 4 ke 5 hari untuk membuat analisis. Ni dah lawan towke! Nampak sangat tak ada 'sense of urgency.' Jadi, dia pun menghantar telegram pada MacGillivray pada 22 Okt 1955, tapi secara diplomatik le:

"I am anxiously awaiting your further appreciation promised in paragraph 4 and trust it may take less than four or five days.

2. In meantime I must tell you frankly of misgivings which your telegram has aroused. As you know, Rahman was publicly committed to meeting before I was consulted and I only agreed on clear understanding that sole purpose of meeting was to clarify the terms of the amnesty. I feel most emphatically we should stand by that. If Rahman listens to terrorists'views on other  matters this will inevitably lead to discussion of them and in effect to negotiation.

3. I know you will take above views into accounts in framing fuller appreciation which I now await." (FO 371/116941, no 69, Telegram from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Sir D MacGillivray, 22 Oct 1955).

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