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Sunday, September 19, 2010

Tergamam

Saya 'copy & paste' petikan e-mel berikut dari Lt Ishak Isa. 

July 1976.
Ops Hentam Sedar
Area of Ops (AO): KULIM, Kedah.
Ini adalah operasi pertama di Semenanjung buat 14MTA setelah berpindah dari Sandakan, Sabah ke Pulau Pinang.
Commanding Officer - Lt Kol Zainal  Abidin Md Dan (RAMD): IO - Kapt Harmain (RAMD): Ops  Officer - Kapt Ismail ( TA).
Tac HQ: Karangan Camp.

I was with A coy . OC Kapt Zaini ( RAMD). Initial AO (Area of Operations) was Sg. Pasir- Jalan Mahang - Sedim.

A month later, my platoon was given a new mission to be deployed into Tawar Estate (not far from Baling) to conduct RKK ( Ronda Kumpulan Kecil). I lead one  RKK and my sargeant one RKK.

Enter Tawar estate at about 1400hr. Move into respective AO and landed near a small stream not far away from one kongsi. That was about 1730hr.  Took up position; each of us take one rubber tree in an all-round defence . While I was  sending our SITREP for that day, I heard L/Kpl Tuin... " Tuan Musuh".  I look at him and he pointed at the direction of the musuh. I move forward to get a clearer look but was not sure about it. 

The musuh 1st recce scout stop, look at me . Both of us berpandangan, and both take cover behind the rubber tree. Gave my signal to Kpl Tuin and we leap frog to the musuh. Cross the river and leap frog for about 300 meters and nothing happened . The musuh was gone.... last light and nothing can be seen...no shooting...no kill... no report. 

This group of musuh, was ambushed by our RKPT two weeks later. The ambush took place in the kongsi. Actually the RKPT was there for almost three month waiting for this musuh. I came to know about it when I overheard in the weekly intel briefing while operating in Gubir.

Lessons learned from this incident.

1. It is very difficult to operate in rubber estate bcos we cannot differentiate musuh and rubber tappers. Even the musuh didn't expect we were there as we were not far away from the kongsi.

2. Detail intelligent report was not given to us and friendly forces operating in the AO was not mentioned at all. 

Mejar Ishak...Terima kasih.

7 comments:

Robert Rizal Abdullah said...

Squad,

I have experienced such difficulty in the many contacts I had with the CTs. In the jungle, our celoreng looked dark, especially when wet. So were the CTs' uniform. You cannot expect the CTs to be clearly seen wearing the yellow khaki uniforms with bintang tiga / lima caps and we wearing jungle hats and camouflage uniforms! That is seen in films.

You have to be experienced to know it. It is common sense sometimes. Certain AO were forbidden for civilians and if you went head on with unknown persons in the AO, they must be the CTs.

I had taken a number of actions to prevent this confusion. Firstly, I and my soldiers wore beret. If we wear jungle hats we usually use broad and coloured hat bands which we change periodically.

Bamuda d' SUARANG said...

Salam Tua & Sdr Ishak!

Pernah tumpang dgn 14 MTA,di Tawau dan Sandakan pada tahun 1973...dulu,Lt Kol Zainal Che Dan tu org Simpang Taiping,bertugas DA thn 1981 di New Delhi sblm bersara.Kini beliau Presiden Kelab Peg RAMD di KL.
Kapt Harmain tu pula Senior Satu Thn d STAR Intake 19...Banyak kenangan manis semsa d Sabah dulu.

Salam Aidil Fitri!

Bamuda d' SUARANG said...

Salam Tuan!
Mohon maaf sila guna akaun org...Basri bin Hj Omar

FMZam said...

Salam Tuan, Tn Robert Rizal, Tn Mej Ishak,

To any layman's mind, Tn Ishak did the right thing for not shooting at the "musuh" which he could not have identified the exact status of that poor soul or a lucky devil.

To any military conscious mind, Tn Ishak saw what he thought an enemy that he had said it as "The musuh 1st recce scout" but he had not said more other than just a figure in the dark with no mention of that figure being armed with a weapon. If he had seen the figure was crouching in a glimpse or a silhouette of a weapon brandishing man, he would have still to be sure of what he had seen with that of his other members of his RKK, just to be sure that figure was an enemy.

After all an RKK is a recce patrol not a fighting patrol and Tn Ishak certainly knew the rules of engagement of an RKK. If it was a chance encounter, the chance was, that point man of the enemy could have been a lure to a bigger group or enemy's main body hiding somewhere in ambush position to trap the whole of his RKK, and in the late hour of the evening, it would spell certain disaster if a battle had ensued in the darkness with no help and support from anyone at the base.

The MTA had shown they were as duty bound as any regular unit and as Tn Ishak said it, without detailed intelligence (as if it was normal that MTA units were always being taken for granted), Tn Ishak had done what a leader of men must have done it in a situation when no soldier has no time to think but to act with his instinct. Well done sir.

Katon Tin Ton said...

gambar2 ops GUBIR

http://panggilanpertiwi.forumotion.net/laporan-khas-f25/lawatan-aku-ke-museum-tentera-port-dickson-t870-15.htm#53699

Robert Rizal Abdullah said...

I agree with FMZam. Ishak had taken the right decision for not shooting at an unknown target. He wanted to be very sure that the target was the enemy.

I have learned to respect whatever decisions taken by commanders on the ground - be they seemed right or wrong.

Sometimes commanders took what seemed to be the wrong decision but yielded results. Some followed the rules in the books and came up empty-handed.

Nor Ibrahim Bin Sulaiman said...

Saudara Semua,

Thank you for sharing your views.